Warlord Democrats in Africa: Ex-Military Leaders and Electoral Politics by Anders Themnér

Author:Anders Themnér [Themnér, Anders]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781783602490
Goodreads: 31573697
Publisher: Zed Books
Published: 2017-04-15T00:00:00+00:00

Table 4.1 Presidential elections in Mozambique, 1994–2009 (%)

Source: Boletins da República & Comissão Nacional de Eleições de Moçambique.

Table 4.2 2014 Presidential election results

Source: Conselho Constitucional (2014).

Figure 4.1 Parliamentary seats (1994–2014)

Source: Comissão Nacional de Eleições de Moçambique (2014).

For a while in the 1990s RENAMO became the largest opposition party in Africa, overtaken by Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2002. RENAMO won the overall vote and the majority in five provinces in both the 1994 and 1999 elections. Its popularity at that time surprised many observers because of its atrocious record of human rights abuses during the war. Its support indicated discontent at continued domination by FRELIMO and that the country was still divided and the wounds of the civil war are yet to fully heal. Following the 1999 elections and up to 2014 RENAMO was declining as an opposition party, as Figure 4.1 shows, and it was not able to significantly challenge FRELIMO’s hegemony.

Successful demobilization, poverty, lack of service delivery and conflict weariness contributed to an increasing disillusionment among grassroots RENAMO supporters and to protest against an increasingly distant leadership by Afonso Dhlakama.

After the 1994 and 1999 election results, where RENAMO’s vote held up and Dhlakama came close to (or even beat) Chissano’s support, FRELIMO concluded that RENAMO posed an electoral risk, as Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate.7 The response was to more aggressively counter RENAMO, which at times included intimidation and harassment of its supporters, especially during electoral cycles. There have been electoral irregularities in the 1999, 2004, 2008 and 2014 elections. Indeed, the 2004 election was marred by misconduct including widespread ballot box stuffing which may have cost RENAMO at least two parliamentary seats.

RENAMO’s task has not been helped by its lack of skilled cadres. Although it attracted fresh blood following the end of the conflict, this created tension, particularly among those who had remained loyal supporters during the years in the bush. RENAMO’s poverty and inability to deliver on wartime promises contributed to a weakening support base. Carrie Manning noted that this decline was already visible in 1995. She observes that:

However, it is important to note that the reintegration process proceeded haltingly in all areas, and was held up as much by government stiffening the requirements for entry into certain posts as it was by Renamo’s inability to provide the government with accurate and timely data on its education, health, and administrative personnel. Government officials hung back while Renamo teachers and health workers blocked services to Renamo areas until local populations became impatient of Renamo. This strategy deprived Renamo of both patronage (in the form of civil service jobs) and of local popular support. By the end of 1995, Renamo was beginning to lose ground among formerly supportive populations by refusing to allow qualified government teachers and health personnel to come into its zones. For its part, Renamo was torn between not wanting to yield control of its areas and its personnel, and the need for the patronage that state jobs represented. (Manning 1998: 185)

Between 1999 and 2004, RENAMO received about $1.

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